In epistemic logic, some axioms dealing with the notion of knowledge are rather convoluted and difficult to interpret intuitively, even though some of them, such as the axioms .2 and .3, are considered to be key axioms by some epistemic logicians. We show that they can be characterized in terms of understandable interaction axioms relating knowledge and belief or knowledge and conditional belief. In order to show it, we first sketch a theory dealing with the characterization of axioms in terms of interaction axioms in modal logic. We then apply the main results and methods of this theory to obtain specific results related to epistemic and doxastic logics.
Introduction
One of the goals of modern epistemic logic is to elucidate the nature of the interaction between knowledge and belief by means of formal and logical methods. On the basis of a semantics very close to the Kripke semantics of modal logic, Hintikka [18] and subsequent philosophers and logicians tried to formulate explicit principles governing and relating expressions of the form "a knows that ϕ" (subsequently formalized as Kϕ) and "a believes that ϕ" (subsequently formalized as Bϕ), where a is a human agent and ϕ is a proposition. In other words, they sought to determine 'the' logic of knowledge and belief, or at least of idealized versions of these notions. Their quest was grounded in the observation that our intuitions about these epistemic notions comply with some systematic reasoning properties, and was driven by the attempt to better understand and elucidate them [23, p. 15] . For example, the interaction axioms Kϕ → Bϕ and Bϕ → KBϕ are often considered to be intuitive principles: if agent a knows ϕ then (s)he also believes ϕ, and if agent a believes ϕ, then (s)he knows that (s)he believes ϕ. As a matter of fact, assessing whether a given principle holds true or not raises our own awareness of these epistemic notions and reveals to us some of their essential properties.
In computer science, the logic of knowledge is usually considered to be S5, which is obtained by adding to the minimal normal modal logic K the axioms Kϕ → ϕ (T), Kϕ → KKϕ (4) and ¬Kϕ → K¬Kϕ (5). This last axiom 5 is falsified in a situation where the agent has mistaken beliefs. For this very reason, it has been attacked by various philosophers because it cannot hold in general: agents sometimes have mistaken beliefs.
1 Dropping this axiom 5 from S5, we obtain the logic S4. Between the logics S4 and S5, a rich variety of weaker logics of knowledge have been proposed and examined by epistemic logicians [24] , such as S4.2, S4.3 and S4.4. Even if these logics are characterized by axioms which are rather intricate, some of them have been proclaimed by some epistemic logicians as key axioms characterizing the notion of knowledge. For example, Lenzen claimed that " [t] here is strong evidence in favor of the assumption that S4.2 is the logic of knowledge" [24, p. 33] , where the axiom .2 is ¬K¬Kϕ → K¬K¬ϕ. Likewise, Kutschera argues for S4.4 as the logic of knowledge, where the axiom .4 is (ϕ ∧ ¬K¬Kϕ) → Kϕ [33] . As one can easily observe, it is difficult to provide these axioms with a natural and easily understandable reading. In fact, Lenzen derived his axiom .2 from a set of interaction axioms relating knowledge and belief (viewed as some sort of conviction). Similarly, the logic S4.3 is the logic S4 to which is added the axiom .3:
Again, as one can easily notice, it is difficult to provide this axiom with a natural and easily understandable reading. Stalnaker argues that a certain "defeasibility theory" of knowledge gives S4.3 [31, p. 190] .
To better grasp the intuitions underlying these intricate axioms .2, .3 and .4, we show that they can be characterized equivalently in terms of interaction axioms relating knowledge and belief or knowledge and conditional belief. In order to do so, we first need to explain what we mean by "interaction axiom" and what we mean by "characterizing an axiom in terms of interaction axioms". This will lead us to develop a basic theory in modal
